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Strong and Weak Disjunctivism:
A Short Comparative Essay

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Abstract: The brief essay is devoted to the articulation of the main claims of strong disjunctivism in its comparison with weak disjunctivism. They are examined in the main part of the essay as constituting the only possible way to defend a realist conception of truth that combines internalism with the thesis of the independence of truth from introspective justification. It is concluded that weak disjunctivism, even though it compares favorably with its opponents in this respect, cannot claim to defend a realist conception of truth.

Keywords: epistemology, disjunctivism, introspection, knowledge, truth, belief, appearance, hallucination, infallibilism, justification, invalidation.

This essay is devoted to the exposition of the outlines of the epistemological theory that could be termed "strong disjunctivism", in its comparison with "weak disjunctivism". However, we deliberately abstain from specifying which variety of disjunctivism we have in mind — epistemological or metaphysical — because, first, we believe that the prolonged discussion about the distinction between these types of disjunctivism leads nowhere and, second, that any variety of disjunctivism is both epistemological and ontological. We are bound to be as concise as possible and avoid detailed exposition and argumentation on each particular issue because the chosen topic is very extensive, and its exhaustive exposition in the format of a single essay is impossible. In particular, we will not specifically focus on the criticism of conjunctivism.[1]

Strong disjunctivism is a general epistemology that makes statements on the very nature of knowledge. The main purpose of strong disjunctivism is to defend a realist conception of truth while being an integral part of this conception. It could be summarized by three main claims.

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[1] With the term "conjunctivism" we designate non-disjunctive internalism.

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(I)   Justification of an object's truth, the appearance of which[2] is necessarily given in any cognition, is obtained introspectively by virtue of the reality of the very cognition in which it is given, provided it is not invalidated.

(II) The appearance of the truth of an object characteristic of subsequently revealed cognitive error, while being completely real, does not exist either before or after the moment of its invalidation.

(III) Invalidation of a cognition is possible only as ontological.

Each subsequent main claim of strong disjunctivism is a consequence of the previous one. Let us examine them in due order.

In general terms, disjunctivism is usually defined as a claim that the phenomenal character of hallucination should not be accounted for in the same way as the phenomenal character of perception. At the same time, the so-called phenomenal disjunctivism claims that the phenomenal character of perception is an introspectively revealed objectivity constituted by the obtaining of a non-representational relation to mind-independent objects.[3] The general polemical principle of disjunctivism is the rejection of the Common Kind Assumption[4] adopted by conjunctivists as a general ontological kind called to explain the supposed indistinguishability of the phenomenal character of perception and hallucination. According to M.G.F. Martin's apt expression, properly conceived disjunctivism is reactive, i.e. it blocks the skeptical argument that claims to deny our ability to know the external world, and is not intended to give a direct answer to the Cartesian skeptical problem.[5]

Strong disjunctivism agrees with the general rejection of the Common Kind Assumption and with the claim of phenomenal disjunctivism about the nature of the phenomenal character but extends this claim to any cognition and prefers to speak of the appearance rather than of the phenomenal character. Accordingly, (I) is understood as introspectively justified. At this point, it may be objected that even if we admit the introspective accessibility of such a nature of the phenomenal character,

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[2] The appearance of the truth of an object is assumed to be synonymous with the apparent justification of a belief in the truth of an object. The equation of these concepts is justified in the main part of the essay.

[3] R. Locatelli. Relationalism in the Face of Hallucinations, Ph.D Thesis. Université Panthéon-Sorbonne — Paris I, 2016, p. 1.

[4] Or, according to G.S. Rogonyan's gloss — the concept of appearance in abstracto (концепция явления вообще). See Rogonyan G. S. V chyom ne oshibayutsya racional'nye zhivotnye? (Recenziya na knigu McDowell J. Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge. Marquette University Press, 2011, 57 p.) [Wherein do rational animals never go wrong? (Review of J. McDowell Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge. Marquette University Press, 2011, 57 p.)] Epistemologiya i filosofiya nauki, Vol. 34, № 4, 2012, pp. 237–241. (In Russian)

[5] M. G. F. Martin. On Being Alienated. Perceptual Experience, ed. Tamar S. Gendler and John Hawthorne. Oxford, 2006, p. 355.

it does not follow that it is given in any cognition. Thus, the phenomenal character of hallucination, if any, is introspectively indistinguishable from the phenomenal character of perception but, according to the basic principle of disjunctivism, cannot be given in perception, although the latter is undoubtedly a kind of cognition. Therefore, only certain cognitions can be introspectively revealed as true. In response, we argue that such reasoning reveals the weakness, i.e. inconsistency, of the commonly known disjunctivism.

This inconsistency is based on the assumption of the fundamental introspective indistinguishability of hallucination from veridical perception that is characteristic of both conjunctivism and weak disjunctivism. Their only difference in this regard is that the former ontologizes it, while the latter tries to block illegitimate conclusions from it with the thesis that veridical perception is by definition different from hallucination.[6] At this point, we may be put right by recalling that phenomenal disjunctivism does not claim that perception is by definition different from hallucination but that the phenomenal character of hallucination does not exist owing to its being indistinguishable from the phenomenal character of veridical perception that in turn is indistinguishable from itself.[7] To this, we would reply that this claim only corroborates that phenomenal disjunctivism is based on the assumption of fundamental introspective indistinguishability, and that is what matters to us.

Indeed, strong disjunctivism proceeds precisely from the rejection of this assumption[8] and is thereby spared from the difficulties faced by phenomenal disjunctivism. The main one R. Locatelli called the puzzle of phenomenal character caused by the need to reconcile the assumption of introspective indistinguishability with the thesis that hallucination does not have its own phenomenal character.[9] From our perspective, the assumption of indistinguishability is made on the basis of an erroneous understanding of introspection since the latter is understood as constituted by the obtaining of a relation to an object only provided that it is warranted by a perception which truth is justified independently. However, this assumption cannot be considered a necessary consequence of the inability of introspection to detect a false cognition at the moment of its occurrence because all the parties recognize this inability. It is rather interwoven with a more general view on the nature of cognition as having to be true ontologically in order to serve as a warrant for true introspection. As a result of all these assumptions, it comes out that introspection must be ontologically warranted by true cognitions in order to be constituted by relation to

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[6] H. Logue. Disjunctivism. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, ed. by M. Matten. Oxford, 2015, p. 198.

[7] R. Locatelli. In Defence of Phenomenal Disjunctivism: An Elucidation. Phenomenology and Mind, Issue 4, 2016, p. 158.

[8] This, however, is not the main controversial point, as will be shown below.

[9] R. Locatelli. Disjunctivism and the Puzzle of Phenomenal Character. Vieira da Cunha R., Morando C. and Miguens S. (eds.) From Minds to Persons: Proceedings of MLAG's First Graduate Conference. FLUP, Porto, 2014, p. 50.

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objects, while this warrant itself can be ascertained only in terms of its being already a fact. This implies, first, that introspection is epistemologically neutral[10] in itself, i.e. deprived of knowledge, and, second, that the introspectively revealed truth of the justifying cognition had to be corroborated by yet another cognition. This way, weak disjunctivism methodologically presupposes a peculiar combination of a vicious circle and regressus ad infinitum.

Conjunctivists reason in a similar way, but since they ontologically adhere to the Common Kind Assumption, they can interpret the introspection's neutrality thesis only in the sense of its inability to provide access to mind-independent objects, and see its necessary ontological warrant in true cognitions related to "real non-physical entities".[11] One could say that conjunctivism presupposes the fallibilism of introspection that requires its ontological justification by a certain class of true cognitions not related to mind-independent objects.[12] In any case, it is difficult not to notice a common paradigm in the reasonings of weak disjunctivists and conjunctivists: the interdependence of the assumptions of introspective indistinguishability of hallucination from true perception and of the requirement for introspection to be ontologically warranted by a true cognition. Accordingly, we argue that the introspection's neutrality thesis is only a more general version of the Myth of the Given, the criticism of which in the familiar sense is one of J. McDowell's main concerns.[13]

At this juncture, it is necessary to return to an omission that was made at the very beginning of the discussion. There we have formulated the objection that introspection is constituted by a relation to mind-independent objects only in the case of certain cognitions. The further argumentation in defense of this objection has overlooked the fact that (I) does refer not to the object's truth necessarily given in any cognition but to the introspective justification of its appearance. Without this qualification, (I) would look like a perverse thesis of weak disjunctivism that precisely claims the necessity for a cognition to be ontologically true in order to warrant true introspection. From it, it necessarily follows that true introspection cannot be warranted by every cognition. However, (I) rejects this thesis considering it to be related to an erroneous understanding of introspection, and speaks not of the justification of introspection by a cognition but simply of the justification of the apparent truth of an object. Now, after we have noticed this omission, it may be objected that in this case, the claim that the justification of the truth's appearance is

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[10] F. Pereira. Gandarillas Sense-data, Instospection and the Reality of Appearances. Praxis Filosófica, Nueva serie, Issue 33, agosto-diciembre 2011, pp. 103–104.

[11] Ibid, p. 79.

[12] But being their representations, according to representationism.

[13] See J. McDowell. Mind and World. London, 1996; Idem. Avoiding the Myth of the Given. Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars. London, 2009, pp. 256–272.

obtained by virtue of the reality of its cognition is false because introspection does not have a justifying power in relation to the truth of an object. On the contrary, the truth of an object, given only in the class of true cognitions, has a justifying power in relation to true introspection, which by itself can be justified only as neutral. For the most part, we have already answered this objection and should further note that we refuse to isolate introspection from cognition as such and to distinguish it as a separate kind of cognition because we see this as neither necessary nor possible.

If one admits that this necessity consists in that introspection must provide access to ontologically true cognitions, then we virtually lose the possibility of a genuine introspective justification for this very necessity because the validity of these cognitions could not be witnessed in the final instance, which cuts off its way to the possibility of true introspective self-justification. And without it, it is not clear why we should consider such an understanding of introspection justified, particularly given that it posits the ontological truth of objects, since in that case, it is just an ordinary cognition, the exclusivity of which is gained only by assuming that it is allegedly neither true nor false. One may tend to ignore this argument and assume that a "neutral" self-justification will be sufficient because it well explains the fact of the difference between a belief and its truth. For example, let us conceive that some person found out from the media that a fire occurred in his dacha settlement. He concluded that his dacha has burned down and called his neighbor to confirm this. However, the latter did not do this saying that the fire did not affect their property. Such confirmation of the dacha's safety appeared insufficient to the former and so he decided to go to the place himself where he received evidence of the truth of this statement. This way, the person acted on the basis of, first, the general "neutral" self-justification of introspection that presupposes a certain way of its subsequent validation and, second, the introspective justification of a specific introspection that the dacha has burned down, which, however, could not be a priori considered true until the moment of possible validation by a true cognition at the time of the perception of the burned cottage.

We claim that such an explanation of this man's behavior is false since it does not contain the slightest refutation of the fact that he virtually acted on the basis of the apparently true introspection that his cottage has burned down. Accordingly, when he arrived at the place, he has not experienced non-validation[14] of the introspection that the cottage has burned down but simply invalidated it as putatively justified. Otherwise, he wouldn't have gone there. But how can we claim that the introspection in this case was apparently true, even though its falsity was known in advance? And what about the distinction between a belief and its truth? To answer these questions, it is necessary to proceed to the examination of (II).

The explanation of (II) requires for strong disjunctivism to explicate an ontological claim implicitly assumed in (I) and which it is intended to defend. It

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[14] Here we contrast non-validation with invalidation.

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comes down to the distinction between reality and truth of knowledge. In itself, this claim is not a complete ontology but a statement that can be shared by several ontologies. In formulating it, we adhere to the common equation between truth and existence, but, in any case, the main thing for us is to emphasize the difference between reality and truth of knowledge, i.e. that reality of knowledge embraces both truth and falsehood, not exclusively truth. Accordingly, we claim that weak disjunctivism and non-disjunctivism[15] overlook this distinction and base their reasoning on the assumption of the ontological identity between the truth of knowledge and its reality. The consequence of this omission is a tendency that may be called the ontologization of epistemology in the form of hypostasizing non-being[16], which has become particularly widespread in Western philosophy since Descartes.

Indeed, the direct consequences of this tendency are the theses of the necessity of ontologically true cognitions and of introspection's neutrality, which via a number of other ontological implications lead to the thesis of the introspective indistinguishability between the phenomenal character of hallucination and true perception. As we have already noted, these assumptions form a vicious circle of the interdependent theses. At the same time, it should be noted that in modern Western philosophy, the introspection's neutrality thesis and the indistinguishability thesis are so conflated that a special analysis is required to reveal the presence of the first as a necessary precondition for the second. Therein lies the special role of the Cartesian skeptical problem in Western epistemology.

It comes down to the fact that Descartes' evil demon and its more contemporary counterpart — scientists capable to put and maintain our brain in a vat are assumed as ontological instances, while the reality of knowledge is equated with its existence. These assumptions, combined with Cartesian metaphysics, have given birth to a peculiar concept of the knowing subject, according to which, on the one hand, all cognitions must appear to him or her as if they were true, and on the other — each of the empirical ones can theoretically turn out to be an ontological hallucination, i.e. unreal, but as if existent. In other words, the subjectivity so understood must necessarily claim to the truth of knowledge as identical with its reality. If one adheres to epistemological internalism, there can be two ways out of this paradox — weak disjunctivism and conjunctivism. The most radical variety of the first — phenomenal disjunctivism — denies that hallucination has its own phenomenal character, whereas the second has recourse to the Common Kind Assumption. But even the advocates of the first way are forced to admit somehow "existing" unreality of hallucination, i.e. its special status, albeit without assuming sense-data.[17] Therein lies the extremely far-reaching tendency of hypostasizing non-being.

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[15] The category of "non-disjunctivism" apparently includes conjunctivism and externalism.

[16] In particular, in the form of the assumption of sense-data in the case of hallucination.

[17] H. Logue. Disjunctivism… p. 212.

Strong disjunctivism cannot accept the thesis about the unreality of hallucination for two main reasons: first, it distinguishes the reality of knowledge from its truth and, second, sees no reason to distinguish hallucination as a separate category. Indeed, the indistinguishability thesis leads to the claim that an object of hallucination, unlike one of a cognitive error, is unreal, and, on this basis, the conclusion is drawn about the special status of hallucination.[18] Moreover, the view of hallucination, whether positive or negative, does not change anything in this status. This is the meaning of Descartes' first and second meditations. Strong disjunctivism denies the validity of such a line of argument.

In this case, however, we cannot reduce the whole problem to Descartes' innovations. To begin with, the characterization of Cartesian skepticism as radical is a misunderstanding.[19] From our perspective, only that kind of skepticism could be called radical which calls into question the very apparent truth of cognition as such and could be reduced to the following formula: any cognition as such can be erroneous. However, such a statement has never occurred in Western philosophy. In Descartes' case, it is easy to realize that he simply questions the certain class of cognitions while following the classical dualism of the intelligible and the sensible. The questions as to why the doubt of the validity of sensory experience might have seemed so radical and could not have been developed by Descartes' predecessors are not directly relevant to the assessment of the possibility of radical skepticism. The equivocation of the term "external" has undoubtedly played a major role here, since Descartes has first questioned the "external" world while contrasting it with the certainty of the "internal" one — that is, a specifically interpreted sphere of the intelligible.[20] But the semblance of radicality of such a kind of skepticism, which, on top of all, contrary to its creator's claim, is not presuppositionless, only emphasizes its rejection of true radicality since the reality of cognitions as such does not depend on their typology.

But if Cartesian scepticism cannot be called radical, perhaps the scepticism of the Humean, conjunctivist kind should be characterized this way? The general line of reasoning of this kind of skepticism is as follows: since the phenomenal character of hallucination is introspectively indistinguishable from the phenomenal character of perception, introspection cannot be recognized as a way to justify true knowledge of the external world.[21] Only the last part of this formulation ("of the external world") allows us to answer the question in the negative and saves conjunctivism from complete absurdity since this concept here remains Cartesian. Accordingly, conjunctivists are not radical sceptics but introspective fallibilists bordering on irrationalism, which is clearly appreciable already in Hume and was later rightfully

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[18] M. Soteriou. Disjunctivism. London, 2016, p. 158.

[19] H. Ben-Yami. Descartes' Philosophical Revolution: A Reassessment. London, 2015, p. 195.

[20] In the course of this interpretation, the assumption that sensory qualities are instantiated exclusively in the "immaterial" mind was of particular importance.

[21] F. Pereira Gandarillas. Sense-data… p. 81.

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disclosed by Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and others. Therefore, no matter how serious the differences between Humean and Cartesian skepticism are[22], the rejection of the distinction between the reality of knowledge and its truth, together with the introspection's neutrality thesis, logically leads to an understanding in which intelligible objects "screen off" empirical ones. Essentially, all this can be found already in Plato — Descartes only introduces the indistinguishability thesis and initiates its conflation with the introspection's neutrality thesis.

Cartesian scepticism acquires a certain acuteness only in combination with these more general factors — overlooking the distinction between the reality of knowledge and its truth, the classical dualism of the intelligible and the sensible, and, indeed, weak disjunctivism. One could say that weak disjunctivism entails the skeptical problem only if it adheres to this classical dualism. If we add to these three factors more recent "Gettier problem", we would get a rather complete context of the disjunctivism's range of problems. If weak disjunctivism confines itself only to overlooking the distinction between reality and truth of knowledge, while departing from the dualism of the intelligible and the sensible[23], then it could preserve its positive content and would not be so artificially dependent in its formulations on the indistinguishability thesis and the "Gettier problem". To make the discussion more concise, let us proceed to the examination of the latter.

The so-called Gettier problem, formulated in 1963 by the American philosopher Edmund Gettier in a three-page article *Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?*[24], is simultaneously a further stage of the alleged radicalization of skepticism and its natural decay along with conjunctivism. Cast in practical terms, it comes down to the following question: is it possible to tell the time using a broken clock that "displays" 3:00 p.m., at 3:00 p.m., without knowing that it is broken.[25] Strong disjunctivism answers this question unambiguously positively and does not see it as a problem. Weak disjunctivism, from our perspective, is capable to give the same answer. Accordingly, the attitude to this pseudo-problem can serve as a reliable criterion for distinguishing disjunctivists and non-disjunctivists. Gettierism[26] sees a problem in any answer to this question because a positive answer supposedly leads to the possibility

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[22] M. G. F. Martin. The Reality of Appearances. Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings, ed. by Alex Byrne and Heather Logue. Cambridge, 2009, p. 110.

[23] The question might be formulated more narrowly — merely about the rejection of the indistinguishability thesis. But the possibility of such a way of posing the question depends on the degree of interdependence between this thesis and the dualism of the intelligible and the sensible, which seems to be strong enough.

[24] E. Gettier. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis, Vol. 23, Issue 6, June 1963, pp. 121–123.

[25] D. Pritchard. What Is This Thing Called Knowledge? New-York, 2006, pp. 25–26.

[26] We call "gettierism" a philosophical tendency to treat the "Gettier problem" seriously. See S. Hetherington. Knowledge and the Gettier Problem. Cambridge, 2016, p. 4.

of obtaining accidental knowledge, which is contrary to its character as justified true belief, whereas a negative one is impossible since in the situation under discussion we still have a justified true belief. Here it is tacitly assumed that knowledge is precisely justified true belief, and Gettier himself has attributed such an account of knowledge to Plato. His followers have attributed it to Descartes, Kant, and others. As recent research has shown, the strict formulation of this account predates the publication of the article in question just by 11 years[27], but, in any case, we believe it reasonable to associate this account with conjunctivism, i.e. only with Kant, if to confine oneself to the abovementioned list of philosophers. In this sense, the "Gettier problem" is a kind of motivation for the transition from conjunctivism to externalism. However, since this "classical" account of knowledge has gained universal acknowledgment, we cannot ignore it and so concede that it is possible to extend it to weak disjunctivism, provided only that we distinguish two types of justified true belief — disjunctivist and conjunctivist.

In any case, strong disjunctivism and externalism cannot adhere to this account of knowledge. And while the latter can agree with the definition of knowledge as true belief, the former could accept the following definition of it — justified belief.[28] Thus, one of the most radical assertions of externalism concerning this matter can be formulated as follows: since it is true that I am currently writing this paper, I am necessarily believing this. In other words, if I were not writing this paper, I wouldn't believe that I was.[29] In virtue of its account of knowledge, externalism claims to provide an elegant answer to the skeptical problem or even to constitute the only possible way to solve it[30], while adhering to the indistinguishability thesis.[31] Strong disjunctivism could recast this assertion as follows: if I were not necessarily conclusively justified that I am currently writing this paper, I could not ascertain the truth of the fact that I am writing this paper. However, any definitions of knowledge and comparisons of statements will be useless until we pay attention to the different conceptions of truth they assume.

Indeed, while the equivocation of the term "knowledge" in its various definitions is relatively easy to detect, the second equivocation, of the term "truth", is much easier to overlook. However, if this happens, all mutual criticism would be doomed to miss the point, especially if not an abstract conception of truth is

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[27] J. Dutant. The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis. Philosophical Perspectives, 29, Epistemology, 2015, p. 115.

[28] Here it should be taken into account that externalism uses both these definitions but understands the latter in the sense of the former. Since we emphasize the different meanings of these definitions, we are interested in their strict demarcation.

[29] B. C. Johnsen. Nozick on Scepticism. Philosophia, Vol. 16, Issue 1, April 1986, p. 67.

[30] See, e.g., M. Bergmann. Externalist Responses to Skepticism. Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, ed. by J. Greco. Oxford, 2008, pp. 504–538.

[31] K. Farkas. What is Externalism. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 112, Issue 3, February 2003, p. 203.

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concerned but the very attribute of a true object. To begin with, even if we distinguish between the reality of knowledge and its truth, these two characteristics of knowledge still remain interdependent, so the one who claims and the one who denies this distinction cannot mean by truth strictly the same thing. In this essay, we do not claim to give an exact definition of truth as an attribute, since it may vary within strong disjunctivism, but at least aim to defend a realist conception of truth by opposing it to a causal conception. As a point of departure, it is reasonable to choose an analysis of the role of infallibilism in each of the epistemological theories under consideration.

In general terms, infallibilism is considered an epistemological view, according to which one's belief can be known to be true only if one's evidence guarantees its truth.[32] By contrast, fallibilism claims that one's belief can be known to be true even if one's evidence does not guarantee it.[33] Both these definitions implicitly equate reality of knowledge with its truth; besides, infallibilism is considered as leading to scepticism since it is supposedly an obviously unfeasible requirement. However, inasmuch as we, on the one hand, distinguish the reality of knowledge from its truth, and, on the other, as internalists, discriminate between a belief and its truth[34], we consider it necessary to recognize at least three types of infallibilism and the corresponding types of fallibilism: knowledge-infallibilism, justification-infallibilism, and truth-infallibilism. The combination of all three types of infallibilism or fallibilism within the framework of a single theory has seemingly not yet had a precedent in philosophy but, in any case, cannot be considered rational. The epistemological theories under discussion involve various combinations of infallibilism and fallibilism. Let us schematize these differences in the following table.

	Strong disjunctivism	Weak disjunctivism	Conjunctivism	Externalism
Knowledge	Infallibilism	Fallibilism	Infallibilism	Fallibilism?[35]

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[32] J. Brown. Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge. Oxford, 2018, p. 2.

[33] Fallibilism should not be confused with falsificationism since the latter is based on just a specific type of fallibilism and does not address the question of truth.

[34] With a reservation that will be formulated below.

[35] The question mark here expresses the fact that externalists themselves make the precisely opposite assertions on this matter. Thus, M. Williams concludes that "we are all fallibilists nowadays" (M. Williams. Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 103, Issue 1, March 2001, p. 5). J. Dutant, on the contrary, claims that "we are all Infallibilists now", meaning that those externalists who claim to be fallibilists are actually infallibilists (J. Dutant. The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis. Philosophical Perspectives, 29, Epistemology, 2015, p. 119). The first position is more common, but for us, this point is of secondary importance. In any case, the aspect of

Justification[36]	Infallibilism	Infallibilism	Fallibilism	Irrelevant[37]
Truth	Fallibilism	Fallibilism	Infallibilism	Fallibilism?

Table 1. The main epistemological theories and their corresponding types of infallibilism and fallibilism

Based on this typology, we can formulate the view strong disjunctivism opposes in the discussion on the essence of truth — a causal conception of truth. If we give a descriptive characteristic of this conception, we could say it consists either in opposing knowledge and justification in the aspect of fallibilism or, in the most extreme case, in completely ignoring the need for justification. In other words, one could say that strong disjunctivism opposes externalism — not just "pure", abstract externalism, but externalism as the equivalent of causal epistemology. In this sense, it is inherent to all epistemological theories except strong disjunctivism, and the latter is even more interested in criticizing "externalism within internalism" than "pure" externalism. As for the latter, there are serious doubts about its validity since it resembles an illegitimate abstraction of externalism that has always been proper to weak disjunctivism and conjunctivism, on the basis of the seriously taken "Gettier problem".

To clarify the main points of the issue under consideration, let us return to our practical example with the dacha's owner. We have already begun to criticize the explanation that weak disjunctivism would give to this person's behavior but have turned a blind eye to one peculiarity — we are dealing here with a case of erroneous action. Indeed, this is so because he actually does not perform the action that, as it seems to him, he does — he goes to the intact cottage instead of the burned one. Of course, these actions have a lot in common — for example, the path itself. But it is easy to imagine, say, the additional costs that this person incurred in the course of committing this particular erroneous action — was forced to postpone important activities, suffered financial losses, and so on. Now, if weak disjunctivism comes into play, it can be expected that it would apply the method of distinguishing between "good" and "bad" cases[38], which is a kind of its calling card.[39] At first glance, it may

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fallibilism or infallibilism both of knowledge and truth is identical for them, while the question of justification is irrelevant.

[36] Here we mean the introspective justification, although, for us, this formulation is a pleonasm.

[37] The rejection of the requirement for (the introspective) justification is precisely the essence of externalism and is the reason why it is accused of ignoring the difference between a belief and its truth. Accordingly, we do not distinguish a special type of justification for externalism.

[38] The quotation marks here indicate the technical character of the terms used. See, e.g., D. Pritchard. Epistemological Disjunctivism. Oxford, 2012.

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seem that we are dealing with the "bad" case simply because the action is erroneous. Let us assume for the sake of argument that this is the case. However, weak disjunctivism gives the concepts of "good" and "bad" cases a very sophisticated theoretical meaning that comes down to the fact that this distinction is a corollary of the indistinguishability thesis.[40] For this reason, this method leaves an extremely strange impression: on the one hand, it asserts the fundamental inability of introspection to distinguish these cases, on the other — the very necessity for this distinction since there is no other way to justify true introspection. This can mean only one thing — it is accomplished in an externalist manner, or, to use our term, on the basis of a causal conception of truth. Let us assume for the sake of argument that the erroneous action in question can be qualified erroneous on the basis of a causal conception of truth as the "bad" case.

So, since the case is "bad", whereas the subject is necessarily unable to introspectively distinguish a "good" case from a "bad" one, he cannot have knowledge at the time of the erroneous action. In order to block conjunctivist conclusions from the situation, weak disjunctivism adopts justification-infallibilism[41] that, however, stands in contrast to knowledge-fallibilism since knowledge in its understanding is by definition true, whereas truth-infallibilism is rightly considered epistemological immodesty.[42] This way, our dacha's owner commits the erroneous action on the basis of the conclusive grounds for a belief that necessarily provide a justified appearance of truth even in the conditions of a "bad" case. In the literature, this is called an asymmetry in favor of a "good" case.[43] However, provided that justification is assumed here to be different from knowledge itself in the aspect of fallibilism, such an explanation implies the introspection's neutrality thesis. Its unquestionable advantage is the ability to emphasize the difference between a belief and its truth, so necessary for internalism.

We consider this explanation of an erroneous action wrong. The general reason is the very causal conception of truth it presupposes. Thus, both the false character of a "bad" case and the true character of a "good" one are here thought of in causal terms.

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[39] Although, of course, distinguishing between these cases does not in itself constitute disjunctivism.

[40] D. Bar-On, D. Johnson. Epistemological Disjunctivism: Perception, Expression, and Self-Knowledge. New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism, ed. by C. Doyle, J. Milburn and D. Pritchard. London, 2019, p. 320.

[41] J. McDowell. The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for Transcendental Argument. Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, ed. by A. Haddock and Fiona Macpherson. Oxford, 2008, p. 384.

[42] M. G. F. Martin. The Limits of Self-Awareness. Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings, ed. by Alex Byrne and Heather Logue. Cambridge, 2009, p. 280; The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, ed. by T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans, P. Wilken. Oxford, 2009, p. 504.

[43] M. Soteriou. Disjunctivism… p. 120.

This in itself constitutes a problem for weak disjunctivism because a causal conception of truth implies a kind of verification of knowledge that stands in a certain conflict with the adopted justification-infallibilism.[44] However, the main problem lies not even here but in that weak disjunctivism can interpret the erroneousness of action only in the sense that it turned out to be wrong for the subject, especially if the content of a "bad" case is reduced to the indistinguishability. In other words, it admits an improper personalization of a belief's invalidation.[45] Indeed, if the question of truth and falsity of knowledge arises only occasionally, and not owing to the awareness of its very nature, the invalidation of a belief becomes only a correlate of its non-validation according to a causal principle and thus necessarily depending on the awareness of this fact by a specific subject.[46] Therefore, the example in question can for weak disjunctivism be only an abstract case of the fact that a certain person has already realized the falsity of his action, even a knowingly false one. Accordingly, weak disjunctivism is an epistemology of an accomplished fact that takes the first step towards relativism and just slightly differs in this respect from its opponents. Taking into account these arguments, we consider ungrounded the claims of this theory to defend a realist conception of truth, which in its case could only be called quasi-realist.[47]

For strong disjunctivism, the example in question is a concrete case of a knowingly erroneous action, the character of which does not depend on the agent's awareness of this fact. Accordingly, we cannot qualify this case as "bad" in the sense that the subject did not validate the belief that seemed prima facie "justified"[48], i.e. that his cottage has burned down. If we try to adapt the terminology of "good" and "bad" cases to what we have in mind, we could say that despite the fact that the case is actually "bad", the subject here rather, inversely, validated the belief that his cottage has burned down — however, not according to a causal principle, but putatively

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[44] For this reason, weak disjunctivism is accused of failing to positively explain the content of a "bad" case.

[45] Which is merely veiled by the notion of impersonal indiscriminability advocated by phenomenal disjunctivism.

[46] This interpretation can be reduced to the following principle: until the subject has not experienced non-validation of a certain belief, it cannot be considered invalidated.

[47] This claim is partly based on a certain consensus according to which adoption of truth-fallibilism is sufficient to defend a realist conception of truth. We consider this condition insufficient. See, e.g., D. Pritchard. What Is This Thing Called Knowledge? New-York, 2006, p. 154.

[48] Quotation marks here express the problem consisting in the fact that we allegedly cannot say so literally but only, at best, "it seemed reasonable to him, but was not so due to non-validation". What was the objective component of this "justification" that claimed to be conclusive, constitutes the main question to weak disjunctivism.

justified in line with (I).[49] In the first part of this essay, we have characterized this introspection as apparently true and can now clarify that we were referring primarily to knowledge-infallibilism, and not just to justification-infallibilism since the justification in hand is putative but completely real. If one strictly separates these types of infallibilism and adopts only the latter, it becomes difficult to understand how one can reconcile a causal conception of truth with the preliminary introspective justification, but not yet validation, of a certain belief, especially in a "bad" case. The answer will seemingly be that only those beliefs that have an element of doubt require causal validation, especially if they are empirical or testimonial. Indeed, why would the dacha's owner need to make the trip if he knew in advance that his cottage has remained intact, or even has burned down?

It is fair to say that it would be an oversimplification to assert that he went there merely on the basis of the justified belief that his cottage had burned down. Rather, a more complex set of beliefs, or indeed an element of doubt, should be admitted here. However, we argue that even if the element of doubt is admitted here, i.e. the presence of supposedly equally-justified alternatives, and even if doubt is to be characterized as false knowledge, it should be stated that this person acted on the basis of positive knowledge. But how can introspection be really justified while being knowingly false? In response, we will never tire of repeating: according to a realist conception of truth as independent of justification.[50] But if introspection is obviously false, it may be objected, this implies the decisive influence of a subjective factor. Indeed, we will answer, but only as a consequence of invalidation of its objective component, and not in the sense that it unreasonably had a truth-claim identical with reality of knowledge. For the same reason, the subject's awareness of this invalidation is here of secondary importance. Of course, for the example in question, this is difficult to assume, but if our subject happens to be doomed not to realize that his cottage has not burned down, this would not change anything in terms of the true state of affairs. This way, (II) is an expression of a realist conception of truth implied also by (I).

It follows from the above that strong disjunctivism distinguishes between the ontological status of a "bad" case and the moment of its awareness. Otherwise put, it emphasizes the independence of the question of justification from a causal explanation, a confusion between which is peculiar to causal epistemology. But how then does it explain the difference between a belief and its truth? By reducing this question to the question of the difference between justification and truth. Such a reduction is legitimate precisely in the context of defending a realist conception of

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[49] Therefore, the term "validation" here sounds rather ambiguous. With regard to the direct acquisition of new knowledge, we can only understand it as a synonym for justification. For the same reason, we prefer to use the term "justification" instead of "validity".

[50] Or, one could say, independent of one's knowledge (state of being justified).

truth. If it is objected that it is impossible because a belief may appear true without being justified, we reply that a belief can appear true only provided it appears justified. Classical internalists and externalists are unable to refute this claim. However, the former absurdly require duplication of the already occurred justification of a belief, whereas the latter even more absurdly claim that a belief can be true without justification, and this is quite enough.

But what difference can there be between justification and truth, if a belief is necessarily justified and, consequently, reasonably appears to be true? The answer is that the subjective component of justification can be considered in abstracto only in the aspect of the reality of knowledge that embraces not exclusively truth, but both truth and falsehood in the form of apparent truth.[51] This difference is thus always real. However, the question of the truth of the subjective component of justification can only be raised only insofar the truth in question is the attribute of an object, not a belief, and only in a "good" case. Given the distinction between knowledge-infallibilism and truth-fallibilism, which, we claim, is the necessary condition for a realist conception of truth, knowledge is necessarily a justified appearance of truth, and its reality as such cannot be invalidated. But since it does not exist in a "bad" case even as an appearance, while in a "good" case being an attribute of an existing object[52], the difference between justification and truth of a belief can be revealed as existing only in a "bad" case due to the non-existence of an object. In a "good" case, there is no difference between justification and truth of a belief.[53] This way, strong disjunctivism does not ontologize this difference and regards the requirement of its existence even in a "good" case as a rejection of a realist conception of truth, which is merely masked by an appeal to the necessity for a normative character of justification.[54] Whereas an attempt to abstract a belief from its validity will only emphasize this rejection that leads to conjunctivism and externalism.

At the same time, special attention should be paid to the difference between strong disjunctivism and externalism since, in this respect, there is a deceptive partial similarity between them. The former, although it denies, unlike other forms of internalism, the existence of the difference between justification and truth in a "good"

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[51] Therefore, from our perspective, falsehood, and falsehood that appears true are one and the same.

[52] This does not mean that truth does not require justification to be known but only that it does not depend on it, being an attribute of an existing object, not a belief.

[53] In other words, in a "good" case, the identity between justification and truth is obtained directly by virtue of the reality of a cognition, and an apparent truth-claim of a belief related to the attribute an object is indeed justified. In a "bad" case, an identical in the aspect of reality apparent truth-claim is merely putative. And, one could say, constituting an attribute of a belief, not an object. Therefore, when it comes to a truth, strong disjunctivism is interested not in the subjective state of being justified in it but bin the existing content.

[54] See, e.g., M. Lammeranta. Theories of Justification. Handbook of Epistemology, ed. by I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen, J. Wolenski. Dordrecht, 2004, pp. 469–471.

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case, speaks of the introspective justification. Externalism denies this distinction in all the cases by rejecting the introspective justification as such. But doesn't this lead to the fact that the truth of a belief cannot be guaranteed even in a "good" case despite the necessarily and conclusively justified truth-claim? It should be acknowledged that this is actually so but with a number of serious reservations. Thus, any form of fallibilism claims that despite the abstract lack of guarantees of truth, the ignorance of whether we are in a "bad" case[55] does not affect justification.[56] In our case, fallibilism is very weak because we claim that we are necessarily ignorant of this since we can be reasonably justified only in the opposite. Given that strong disjunctivism can impose no restrictions on the epistemic closure principle[57], other than general distinction between the reality of knowledge and its truth, such an ignorance will indicate the validity of the belief[58] that we are not in a "bad" case.[59] Accordingly, strong disjunctivism denies the legitimacy of methodological doubt in philosophy that claims to be a substitute for a real doubt. Moreover, truth-fallibilism is further weakened by the fact that from the perspective of strong disjunctivism, the truth of such belief as "2 + 2 = 4" and of any empirical or testimonial belief is "non-guaranteed" equally. This cannot be offered by any other epistemological theory, including ones that postulate truth-infallibilism.

At this point, we may be accused of the following. Given a "bad" case cannot be detected introspectively and there is no ontological difference between a "good" case and its appearance, truth will be reduced to appearance. This leads to a kind of idealism that resembles the Common Kind Assumption since it assumes a common element of truth between truth and falsehood that exists in false introspection. Besides, it turns out that this element of truth in false introspection can only be understood as unreal despite its alleged existence. Such a criticism, besides the erroneous attribution of a causal conception of truth to strong disjunctivism, would overlook the fact that the latter is precisely disjunctivism. In fact, strong disjunctivism, by claiming that there is no difference between a "good" case and its appearance, does not admit that a true element exists in false knowledge. Indeed, knowledge presupposes a justified

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[55] Although, externalists may claim that it is possible to have a non-introspective knowledge of a "bad" case while formulating a kind of pseudo-conjunctivism. See M. Engel, Jr. Personal and Doxastic Justification in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 67, Issue 2, August 1992, pp. 133–150.

[56] S. Cohen. Justification and Truth. Philosophical Studies, Vol. 46, Issue 3, November 1984, pp. 281.

[57] The closure principle could be formulated as follows: knowing a certain statement implies knowing the falsity of an opposite statement. See Y. Avnur. Closure Reconsidered. Philosopher's Imprint, Vol. 12, Issue 9, April 2012.

[58] However, we do not claim that a belief is in any case justified by virtue of its being not invalidated.

[59] Of course, this does not rule out the necessity to consider the positive, practical possibilities of invalidation of a belief.

appearance of truth, but it exists only in a "good" case. In a "bad" case, it, being completely real and irrefutable in the aspect of reality, is merely putative.[60] Therefore, although strong disjunctivism does admit a common element between the two cases[61] — knowledge in the form of real, necessary, and conclusively justified appearance of truth — it is the most strict form of disjunctivism since by virtue of the very reality of knowledge accepts only two statuses of a belief in any situation — either true and justified in a "good" case or false and unjustified in a "bad" one. Weak disjunctivism pretends instead that there is nothing at all in common between the two cases, but since this goes against common sense, it is forced to posit some intermediate form of introspection[62] and try to explain the "existence" of an unreal false element in it. As for "idealism" — even though strong disjunctivism admits subjective justification in both cases, it relates the attribute of truth to an object, not a belief. Accordingly, in a "good" case, knowledge is both subjectively justified and objectively true but in the necessary correlation with the truth of an object[63], which does not fit into the framework of idealism properly understood.

The main claim of strong disjunctivism about the distinction between "good" and "bad" cases can be formulated as follows: a "good" case can be distinguished from a "bad" one only introspectively, even though the latter cannot be detected in a purely introspective way since by virtue of the reality of knowledge in both cases necessarily appears subjectively "good" until the moment of possible invalidation of this putative appearance. This way, strong disjunctivism, in contrast to other theories, admits exclusively introspective distinguishability of a "good" case based on its conclusive rational justification.[64] For this reason, it considers inconsistent the approach of other types of internalism that tend to somehow "distinguish" these cases despite denying the introspective distinguishability of a "good" case. Such an approach, undoubtedly, invites externalism. However, two points need to be emphasized in this context: first, strong disjunctivism is not a kind of access epistemology in the sense that it allegedly presupposes, in a "good" case, a bridge between reflectively accessible and empirical beliefs that ensures introspective knowledge of the external world[65], and, second, it does not adhere to the thesis that the truth of an object in a "good" case is justified by virtue of its being not invalidated.

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[60] One could say, conclusive in the aspect of the apparent justification of a belief but invalidated in the aspect of the truth of an object.

[61] According to Table 1, both strong disjunctivism and conjunctivism adhere to knowledge-infallibilism.

[62] Or, in other words, that there can be apparently true but non-justified beliefs.

[63] Strong disjunctivism distinguishes the truth of an object from the object itself in the sense of the irreducibility of knowledge to objects.

[64] Strictly speaking, the "exclusively" introspective and simply introspective distinguishability of a "good" case is one and the same thing. We merely emphasize the pointlessness of positing a "good" case in an externalist manner.

[65] See T. Kraft. Epistemological Disjunctivism's Genuine Access Problem. Theoria, Vol. 81, Issue 4, December 2015, p. 323.

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But if we are unable to detect that we are in a "bad" case when this is actually so, doesn't this mean that rational support for a belief in both cases should be considered equal in extent?[66] To answer this question, we should keep in mind that strong disjunctivism does not characterize a "bad" case as indistinguishable from a "good" one. Therefore, a negative response naturally follows from this very fact. Weak disjunctivism faces great difficulties in trying to give a similar answer precisely because it considers both cases indistinguishable.[67] But in fact, strong disjunctivism claims that the question of the strength of the rational support for a belief in both cases cannot even be raised because in a "good" case, this support exists, whereas in a "bad" one it does not. For that reason, it denies the legitimacy of refined "epistemological disjunctivism". The only thing worth noting in this regard is that strong disjunctivism can agree with conjunctivism in asserting the equality of an extent of rational support for a belief in both cases but only in the aspect of the reality of knowledge, not the truth identical with it. Moreover, if we assume that conjunctivism in this case speaks simply of justification, we must admit that the positive content of this theory, in spite of its claims, cannot be based on the assertion in question. If the source of justification for both truth and error is single and consists in knowledge itself, and truth is understood as an attribute of an object, then the essential incapacity of knowledge to naturally recognize a "bad" case can only result from its necessary capacity to conclusively guarantee the distinguishability of a "good" case, not vice versa.

It follows from the thesis about the introspective distinguishability of a "good" case that, in its conditions, we can have knowledge of empirical facts obtained in a purely introspective way. This very fact can frighten classical internalists since they share the traditional assumption of the contingent character of empirical truth as opposed to the necessary character of introspective truth.[68] We cannot analyze this matter in detail in this essay, not only because of the extreme vastness of the topic but also the general reluctance of the proponents of this assumption to recognize it as a problem and, consequently, to try to seriously justify it. Let us just say that the admission of contingent truth is a real curse of Western philosophy, which can only be relevant in the context of causal epistemology. However, its significance cannot be overemphasized, because this assumption nourishes, among other things, skepticism, existentialism, and, most importantly for us, what we have called "externalism within internalism". Indeed, we have pointed out the claims of weak disjunctivism to

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[66] This is the so-called New Evil Genius Problem. See, e.g., R. Neta, D. Pritchard. McDowell and the New Evil Genius. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 74, Issue 2, March 2007, pp. 381–396.

[67] That is, that a "bad" case is such precisely because of its indistinguishability from a "good" one. See D. Smithies. Review of Duncan Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, January 2013. URL: https:Inndpr.nd.edu/news/epistemological-disjunctivism/

[68] D. Pritchard. Epistemological Disjunctivism. Oxford, 2012, p. 46.

distinguish between "good" and "bad" cases in an externalist manner, which cannot be justified without relying on the admission of the contingency of empirical truth. In turn, the examples associated with the "Gettier problem" are staggering in their frivolity in the matter of positing the truth of any empirical belief and give the impression that the entire truth of the empirical sphere comes down to its contingency.

To further clarify the situation, let us compare our statements with the theory of one of the classics of a realist conception of truth, W. Alston.[69] This comparison, on the one hand, will emphasize the additional differences between strong disjunctivism and externalism, and on the other — reveal the fact that a full-fledged defense of a realist conception of truth without relying on disjunctivism should be recognized impossible. Thus, Alston claimed to justify merely a general concept of a realist understanding of truth while considering its nature in terms of the justified true belief account.[70] One could say that he oddly tried to reconcile the incongruous — a causal conception of truth with the thesis of its independency of justification. Therefore, in his interpretation, a realist and causal conceptions of truth look as if they were equal. We argue that this cannot be accidental, simply because Alston did not rely on disjunctivism but was basically an externalist. At the same time, he, like many disjunctivists, embraced the theory of appearing.[71] In particular, he claimed that "what is seen by virtue of undergoing a particular experience is what this experience generates beliefs about"[72], implying that one can't be "directly aware of something that doesn't exist".[73] Since this claim implies a strict distinction between belief and knowledge[74], it comes down to the fact that a belief can be true without justification owing to its generation by apparently true objects. Here Alston diverges from classical internalism, which, on the contrary, claims that an apparently true belief cannot be considered knowledge without justification since only knowledge is generated by objects which truth has already been validated. Accordingly, his main purpose was to demonstrate that the truth of a belief does not require justification since this so-called justification necessarily presupposes the apparent truth of a belief. This line of reasoning leads him to the reduction of truth to appearance while simultaneously claiming it to be an attribute of an object rather than a belief.

The problem lies in the fact that without strong disjunctivism, the last two claims remain ontologically irrelevant. If we try to reduce truth to appearance while simultaneously stressing that it should not require justification, the most we can claim

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[69] See W. Alston. A Realist Conception of Truth. New-York, 1996.

[70] The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers, ed. by John R. Shook. Vol. I. Bristol, 2005, p. 57.

[71] W. Alston. Back to the Theory of Appearing. Noûs, Vol. 33, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 13, Epistemology, 1999, pp. 181–203.

[72] W. Alston. Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Ithaca and London, 1991, p. 57.

[73] W. Alston. Back to the Theory of Appearing... p. 191.

[74] W. Alston. Perceiving God... p. 2.

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is a hypothetical phenomenology of truth, the sterile character of which is further enhanced by the indistinguishability thesis. The only argument in its favor is that those against whom it is directed can offer nothing better. We mean that both Alston and classical internalists are virtually no different regarding the infantile positing of the apparent truth of allegedly non-justified beliefs. It certainly cannot do without the assumption of the contingent character of empirical truth and thus makes us perplexed, not inspired, unlike Alston. Therefore, strong disjunctivism, while accepting these two claims, does not mean that apparently true beliefs cannot be required to be justified but that it is not reasonable to require any more "validation" for beliefs that are necessarily apparently justified. As for the fact that an apparent justification may turn out to be putative — no "validation", even by a true cognition, can save us from this. As a result, it turns out that Alston's conception, contrary to common sense, considers any apparently justified empirical belief not apparently justified. At the same time, strong disjunctivism does not claim that an apparently justified belief is necessarily true but only that this is so solely in a "good" case, and, therefore, it is very sensitive to this matter, unlike other theories that first posit the apparent truth of any allegedly unjustified beliefs and subsequently have to either "censor" beliefs after the fact or refuse to justify them.

This way, strong disjunctivism denies the existence of contingent truths and can, contrary to Leibniz, claim that the truth of the fact that Spinoza died in the Hague is not contingent, even provided that he may have died elsewhere[75]. This is so because the appearance of the truth of an object cannot justify either belief or knowledge. On the contrary, knowledge justifies[76] the truth of an object without being reduced to its appearance. Therefore, strong disjunctivism denies the possibility of a justificative ontological correlate of cognitions while implying their natural mutual consistency not, however, constituting a criterion of truth. But if this is so, it may be objected, then our attempts to avoid idealism are ungrounded since realism presupposes the correspondence theory of truth that precisely implies such a justificative correlate. The answer will be that notwithstanding the correspondence theory of truth, at least its underlying relationalism[77] does not have to imply it. A form of relationalism closest to our theory, adopted by phenomenal disjunctivism, comes down to the claim that the phenomenal character of perception is constituted by the obtaining of a non-representational psychological relation to mind-independent objects.[78] However, it

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[75] H. Ishiguro. Contingent Truths and Possible Worlds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume 4, 1979, p. 358.

[76] However, we do not equate justification with generation.

[77] Relationalism has nothing to do with relationism, which is often referred to by the same term. See Zagidullin Zh., Ivanov D., Trufanova E. Soznanie: ob"yasnenie, konstruirovanie, refleksiya [Consciousness: explanation, construction, reflection]. M., 2016, p. 22. (In Russian). We do not, however, adhere to the definition of relationalism adopted in this monograph.

[78] R. Locatelli. Relationalism in the Face of Hallucinations… p. 1.

cannot fully satisfy us for the reasons outlined throughout this essay, the main ones being that it implies causal epistemology, naïve realism[79], and the indistinguishability thesis.

For strong disjunctivism, it is important to above all stress the commitment to a realist conception of truth, so its theory of appearance could be provisionally termed "acausal relationalism". We do not pretend here to provide its final definition since it seems to be impossible in complete isolation from ontology and may consequently vary. However, the main content of this essay should have made it clear that the theory of appearance in question is not reduced either to naïve realism, to weak disjunctivism, to classical internalism, to externalism, to coherentism, to intentionalism, to phenomenology, to idealism, or pragmatism, being a variety of relationalism that denies the possibility of a justificative ontological correlate of cognitions. To further clarify its identity, we emphasize that it denies any equation at the epistemological level between the justification of a belief or knowledge and their generation and, consequently, the possibility of justifying any belief by the extrinsic appearance of an object. Hence it is impossible for the appearance in question to be assumed as a unity of knowable attributes and an extrinsic to knowledge substratum, which allegedly causally conditions knowledge and motivates a false view of the nature of the cognitive relation as juxtaposed with its objects.

(III) constitutes a direct consequence of the first two main claims and the statements made in the main part of the essay, so its consideration does not require a long analysis. Invalidation of a cognition can be exclusively ontological because there remains no possibility for its having other nature. By the "ontological" nature we mean simply a set of factors extrinsic to a specific invalidated cognition, not to cognition as such. Among them, there will necessarily be another cognition and an ontologically relevant relationship between the invalidating and invalidated cognitions. To clarify the situation, let us compare the main epistemological theories in this aspect.

We have already emphasized that all the parties, except for strong disjunctivism, posit the difference between a "good" and a "bad" case while unreasonably claiming that it is, so to speak, a distinction without distinguishability. At the same time, weak disjunctivism understands invalidation only as a correlate of non-validation. Conjunctivism goes even further in this regard and forms a tendency that, being less emphasized, is no less disturbing than the Common Kind Assumption. It can be illustrated by the way of analogy with the well-known falsificationism of K. Popper, although it is by no means reduced to it. Thus, Popper argued that a theory claiming to be scientific must be fundamentally falsifiable. Conjunctivism, by analogy, virtually claims that a belief claiming to be true must be fundamentally introspectively refutable. This way, first, it admits the possibility of epistemological invalidation of a

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[79] Phenomenal disjunctivism is positioned precisely as a way to defend naïve realism that implies the indistinguishability thesis.

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cognition and, second, claims it to be the only possible way to invalidate it. Therefore, it does not merely try to present invalidation as a correlate of non-validation but implies that introspection presupposes it by its very nature. For it, therefore, the ontological validation of a belief is simultaneously the epistemological invalidation of an opposite belief. Let us summarize the identified differences in the following table.

	Strong disjunctivism	Weak disjunctivism	Conjunctivism	Externalism
Justification	Epistemological	Ontological	Ontological	Irrelevant
Invalidation	Ontological	Ontological	Epistemological	Ontological

Table 2. The main epistemological theories and their corresponding views on the nature of justification and invalidation of a belief

The assumption of the epistemological nature of invalidation is undoubtedly nourished by the indistinguishability thesis and can be found already in Locke's tabula rasa theory and Hume's skepticism. Thus, Hume builds his epistemology on the recognition of the impossibility of introspective justification of empirical beliefs due to the contingent character of their truth and tries to reduce introspective justification to the same type of truth, i.e. to probabilism. All this is presented as a radical skepticism, although it is clear that Hume has merely accomplished a reductio ad absurdum of the specifically interpreted sphere of the intelligible inherited from Descartes and Locke. He concludes that the latter is disastrous for the justification of empirical beliefs and leads to a total extinction of belief and evidence. However, the situation can be is saved by the possibility of an empirical, probabilistic justification.[80] Even though it is based on an "idealistic" causality, supported by a theory of the association of ideas, it retains all the features of necessity.[81] This way, Hume tries to wrongfully dissociate introspective infallibilism and introspective necessity, leaving only the latter. This leads precisely to the Common Kind Assumption and epistemic egalitarianism[82] since the justification of introspection by experience would be

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[80] R. J. Fogelin. Hume's Skepticism. The Cambridge Companion to Hume, Second Edition. Cambridge, 2009, pp. 225–226.

[81] M. Boehm. Certainty, Necessity, and Knowledge in Hume's Treatise. David Hume: A Tercentenary Tribute, ed. by S. Tweyman. Ann Arbor, 2013, p. 84.

[82] K. Meeker. Hume's Radical Skepticism and the Fate of Naturalized Epistemology. New-York, 2013, p. 87.

impossible if beliefs did not have an equal status in terms of lack of justification. But, in addition, this understanding presupposes that any belief can be epistemologically invalidated simply by the fact of ontological validation of an opposite belief. The destructive nature of such an understanding is obvious.

It does not notice, however, that constitutes a grotesque form of the errors of weak disjunctivism. Thus, in the first part of the essay, we have already noted the inconsistency of a theory that introspection can be considered true only if it is validated by a true cognition, despite the adherence to justification-infallibilism to which nothing can be added in terms of justification. The view under consideration goes even further — it considers necessary only that introspection which is validated by experience, and pretends that its infallibilism is out of the question. However, it is unable to explain why some introspection should be considered necessary, not any other, and why it has an invalidating capacity.

In conclusion, we would like to draw attention to the undeservedly large role played by the consideration of the thesis about the indistinguishability between hallucination and true perception in the structure of this essay. As should have become clear from the second part of the essay, the emphasis on it was dictated only by the polemical situation, not by the special importance of this thesis in comparison with other issues. In fact, the need to constantly take it into account rather interfered with the main line of argument due to its dependence on other theses of an ontological nature. Thus, it is actually a remote consequence of the classical dualism of the intelligible and the sensible, which, in turn, is the result of the equation of reality of knowledge with its truth. As for the introspection's neutrality thesis, it should be directly traced to the latter equation rather than to the indistinguishability thesis. Accordingly, we argue that disjunctivism should not be formulated in strict correlation with this thesis. From our perspective, it is rather based on a more "simple" idea that comes down to the fact that the introspective justification of a belief in a "bad" case cannot be considered existent precisely due to the non-existence of the objective component of introspection. And we concede that weak disjunctivism can be formulated based precisely on this idea but without involving the indistinguishability thesis or even the dualism of the intelligible and the sensible. Another thing is that it will not thereby become decisively more consistent since it is incapable to defend a realist conception of truth necessary to justify this idea.

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